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Did the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 
initiate a Revolution in the American Trade Policy? 
Claude Schwob ∗ 
Abstract: »Bewirkte der “Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act” von 1934 eine 
Revolution in der amerikanischen Handelspolitik? «. Some historians think 
that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934 marked a revolu-
tion in the American commercial policy. In order to evaluate this assessment 
we examine in detail the trade policy instruments implemented and the out-
comes yielded by the American trade policy after 1934 and before the GATT 
came into effect (1948). We conclude that the RTAA did not revolutionize the 
American trade policy. The RTAA conveys first of all a change in the protec-
tion technology. But the “new” American trade policy was also given the goal 
to expand American exports and to promote the American economic and po-
litical influence in the world, while the “ancient” one has been more defensive 
and had intended first to protect the American economy from foreign competi-
tion. 
Keywords: unilateralism, bilateralism, protectionnism, Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement Act, trade policy. 
 
Some historians think that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 
1934 marked a turning point in the American commercial policy. This opinion 
is championed by the history professor and nine years member of the US Inter-
national Trade Commission (1981-1990) A. Eckes Jr.: “Cordell Hull and his 
associates had pulled off a revolution in US trade policy. As a result of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program, the average tariff level fell 80 percent, 
effectively opening the US market to international competition and helping to 
erase the merchandise surplus that had embarassed US officials during the 
1930s.” (Eckes 1995, p. 177). In order to evaluate this assessment, the follow-
ing paper examines in detail the trade policy instruments implemented and the 
outcomes yielded by the American trade policy after 1934 and before the 
GATT came into effect (1948). This question is not only significant for histori-
ans but is of special relevance today when an international economic crisis 
pattern with some similarities to the 1930s one is not impossible. Mutatis mu-
tandis, the lessons from history are useful in such circumstances. 
                                                             
∗  Address all communications to: Claude Schwob, Université de Strasbourg, 61 Avenue de la 
Forêt-Noire, 67085 Strasbourg Cedex, France; 
e-mail: schwob@unistra.fr, schwob@cournot.u-strasbg.fr. 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 34 — 2009 — No. 4, 377-389 
 378
The evolution of US tariffs and the post 1929 crisis context 
Before 1934 and except during a brief episode at the beginning of the 20th 
century, the American trade policy had exhibited a tendency to protect domes-
tic sectors from the competition of foreign firms and originated in an unilateral-
ist mind (Schwob 2008). The Smoot Hawley Tariff Act (1930) is often seen as 
the climax of the protectionnist orientation in that policy, given that the tariffs 
then legislated rose to their historical heights in the 20th century. The begin-
ning of the 1930s was a period of withdrawal of the countries into themselves 
as an answer to the 1929 crisis. And the United States took part in that move-
ment. However that trend of trade policy was not unanimously approved in the 
American society neither by economic experts nor by political circles. The 
New York Times (May 5, 1930) published an address (signed by 1028 econo-
mists members of the American Economic Association) to President Hoover, 
Senator Smoot and Representant Hawley1, drawing their attention to the disas-
trous results such a trade policy would generate for the American economy. In 
the political area, one standard bearer of the fight against economic isolation-
ism and protectionism was C. Hull2. Appointed Secretary of State by President 
F.D Roosevelt in 1933, he held that office during eleven years, resigning a few 
months before Roosevelt’s death. Hull was the inspirer and the originator of the 
RTAA. He considered the American trade policy implemented during the 
1920s responsible for the protectionnist direction taken by the commercial 
policies of many countries in the world (Hull 1948, p. 126). He especially 
regarded the imperial preferences developed by the Commonwealth at Ottawa 
(1932) as originating in, and as retaliating against, the Smoot Hawley Tariff 
Act (Ibid. p. 355). The imperial preference system broke with the tradition of 
unilateral free trade policy pursued by the United Kingdom since the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Consequently, Hull’s plan was to devise a sys-
tem which would have made it possible to cut down in a reciprocal way the 
world pervading protectionnism. 
The RTAA launched a significant change in the decision process of trade 
policy measures.  The administration was given the possibility to negociate up 
to 50% cuts in the Smoot Hawley Tariffs, in compensation for satisfying con-
                                                             
1  C. Wilcox, associate professor at Swarthmore College, was the drafter of that petition. It 
received support from leading academic experts like I. Fisher, W.C. Mitchell, F.W. Taussig.  
2  Hull was a Representative of Tennessee between 1907 and 1930 with a break between 1921 
and 1923. In 1930 he became a member of the Senate until 1933. He was well known for 
the stands he took during these years against the American protectionnism and isolationism. 
In 1916, he proposed the creation of an international multilateral trade conference (Hull 
1916). In 1933 he resigned from his Senator office when appointed Secretary of State by 
President F.D Roosevelt. At that time, shaping the trade policy was a prerogative of the 
State Department. Hull also contributed to drafting the United Nations Charter. These vari-
ous contributions brought him the Nobel peace prize in 1945. 
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cessions made by a partner country in a bilateral negociation with the United 
States. Thus the administration was granted an exception to the constitutional 
rule conferring to Congress detailed control over treatises the President aimed 
at signing, insofar as bilateral agreeements were not actually considered as 
treatises (Diebold 1941, p. 6). The rule establishing the control of Congress and 
an approval by the Senate with a 2/3 majority vote had often been received as a 
legal barrier preventing a real change in the trade policy of the United States. 
Hull noted: “… no American Senate had ever approved a trade treaty negoci-
ated by the Executive which materially reduced tariffs, especially when nego-
ciated without prior Congressional authority.” (Hull 1948, p. 252). Furthermore 
Hull considered that the institutional framework in use before 1934 overly put 
the trade policy under the influence of purely political interests. 
Between 1934 and 1947, i.e. before the GATT came into effect, thirty two 
bilateral agreements had been negociated within the context of the RTAA, 
mainly with American and European countries3. The agreement signed with the 
United Kingdom was considered by Hull as the most important one. The im-
pact assessment of those agreements was controversial. For instance, Diebold 
(1941, p. 124-125) mentioned that the bilateral balance of trade deficit between 
the Latin American countries and the USA increased in 1940. And Eckes (1995 
chapter 5) claimed that some agreements had foreign political purposes but 
slight results in commercial terms. In any case, the Second World War fast set 
limits on their effects.  
According to Irwin’s (1998 p. 1020; p. 1024) calculations, the average ad 
valorem tariff of the United States defined as the ratio between the customs 
revenue and the value of dutiable imports had evolved between 1897 and 1939 
as follows:  
Year Legal framework Average ad valorem tariff 
1897 Dingley Tariff 47,48 % 
1909 Payne Aldrich Tariff 41,38 % 
1913 Underwood Simmons Tariff 26,66 % 
1922 Fordney McCumber Tariff 37,87 % 
1930 Smoot Hawley Tariff 55,32 % 
1934 RTAA 46,7% 
1939 RTAA 37,3% 
 
These results are close to the data given by Eckes (1995, p. 107). They seem 
to confirm the protection strengthening effect of the Smoot Hawley Tariff Act 
and the tariff de-escalation effect of the RTAA. The relative removing of 
American tariff policy from the influence of the Congress seems to have re-
                                                             
3  The complete list of the agreeements negociated during this period can be found in Eckes 
(1995, p. 319 note no 14). 
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duced the average tariff by 18 percentage points in reference to the 1930 tariff 
five years after the RTAA went into effect. 
However these informations do not allow any international comparison of 
protection degrees and hence the location of the United States position in an 
international scale of protection. One of the few comparative essays focusing 
on average tariffs hitting manufactured products is that of Bairoch (1997) and it 
provides the following data (Ibid. p. 294) :  
 
 1913 1925 1931 1950 
United States 44 % 37 % 48 % 14% 
United Kingdom 0 % 5% - 23 % 
Germany 13 % 20 % 21 % 26 % 
France 20 % 21 % 30 % 18 % 
Italy 18 % 22 % 46 % 25 % 
Japan 30 % - - - 
Spain 41 % 41 % 63 % 18 % 
Russia 84 %. - - - 
 
This table suggests that during the years preceding World War II, the United 
States conducted a more protective tariff policy than its major rival and partner 
economies, even if the gap with other countries was narrowing in 1931. The 
protectionnist impact of the Smoot Hawely Tariff Act of 1930 is confirmed.  
But taking into account the average tariff alone, computed as the ratio be-
tween customs revenue and the value of dutiable imports, does not make it 
possible to draw any relevant conclusion about the protective degree of the 
trade policy pursued by a country. 
The limits of focusing on average tariffs 
First that ratio ignores the proportion of duty free imports. Two countries with 
the same average tariff ratio, but the former with an important share and latter 
with a low share of non dutiable imports, do not pratice the same protection 
degree. 
Secondly various instruments of tariff policies can be implemented. Besides 
ad valorem tariffs, specific i.e. lump sum tariffs and compound tariffs i.e. com-
binations of ad valorem and specific tariffs are used. Working out the ratio 
between customs revenue and the value of dutiable imports leads thus to calcu-
lating equivalent ad valorem tariffs for lump sum and compound tariffs. But 
whenever a specific tariff applies to imports the prices of which change over 
time its ad valorem equivalent tariff changes concomitantly. This phenomenon 
contributes to over (under) estimate what could be called the protective inten-
tion of tariff decision makers in case of non expected price increase (decrease) 
of imports. Nevertheless it can soundly be supposed that when choosing lump 
 381
sum rather than ad valorem tariffs the decision makers are fully aware of the ad 
valorem equivalent tariff change induced when prices are varying. Especially, 
when specific tariffs are used, the variation in the rate of equivalent tariff off-
sets the increase (decrease) of price competitiveness of imports. In that sense 
specific tariffs provide a protection guarantee against unanticipated import 
price increase (decrease) which cannot be offered by ad valorem taxing. And at 
a time when Congress was monitoring tariffs, i.e. before passing the RTAA, 
Republican governments markedly preferred specifc tariffs whereas Democrat 
governments rather implemented ad valorem tariffs. 
Irwin’s (1998) calculations allow us to compare the impact of the different 
tariffs acts on the average tariff, wether or not they take into account the price 
variations of imports. Column (6) shows the variation in tariffs when tariff 
legislation and negociated trade agreements only are taken into account 
whereas colunm (7) adds prices variations as a factor determining the average 
tariff. 
This table shows first that the Smoot Hawley Tariff left the share of non du-
tiable imports quite unchanged when compared with the Underwood Simmons 
Tariff Act. And the latter was historically the most favorable Act for foreign 
products in that matter. Furthermore, if the Smoot Hawley Tariff pushed the 
average ad valorem equivalent tariff to its historical highest point, the price 
imports variation was the main cause of that dramatic increase between 1932 
and 1933 since a strong deflation happened during that period. Crucini (1994) 
confirms that the protectionist impact of the Smoot Hawley Tariff was over-
estimated by studies ignoring the impact of price variations on the tariffs voted 
by Congress. The second lesson to be drawn is that after five years of RTAA 
practice, the share of specific and compound tariffs has risen to a level never 
matched in the 20th century. So we conclude that a non negligible part of the 
average ad valorem tariff decrease was attributable to variations in the import 
price index. Irwin ascribes one third of the decrease in the average ad valorem 
tariff to the increase in imports prices during the period 1934-1939. 
All these observations lead us to conclude that the voluntarism of the Con-
gress until 1934 and of the Administration from that date played a less impor-
tant role in the evolution of average tariffs than could be thought at first sight. 
The Smoot Hawley Tariff was accused of too great unworthiness whereas the 
RTAA was credited with to many virtues4. If the RTAA changed the process 
deciding tariffs, the results it yielded are less important than suggested at first 
sight. But to evaluate a commercial policy one cannot concentrate exclusively 
on the examination of its tariff element. Other instruments of trade policy have 
to be taken into account. 
                                                             
4  Irwin (1998) concludes that between 1945 and 1955, when the GATT has been into opera-
tion since 1948, the price inflation (81,4%) is the main cause of the strong drop in the aver-
age ad valorem tariff rate. 
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The reconfiguration of the American trade policy  
Some bilateral agreements included clauses offering the possibility to the 
members countries to withdraw tariff concessions when domestic industry was 
too serioulsy challenged. The agreeement between Mexico and the United 
States negotiated within the context of the RTAA was an example (Viner 1947, 
p. 614). 
Besides the decrease of the average ad valorem tariff, the American trade 
policy used other protection measures like import restraints and more or less 
explicit export subsidies. 
Within the framwework of the New Deal, the National Recovery Act (NRA) 
and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) strengthened the American protec-
tion device as early as 1933, at the very time when the great trade liberalization 
defender Hull was appointed Secretary of State. More industrial imports were 
subjected to quotas by the NRA (Hayford / Pasurka 1991, p. 1386). The AAA 
section 22 allowed agricultural import quotas (Gale Johnson 1947). At the 
same time as the RTAA was introduced, the Jones Costigan Act set quotas on 
sugar imports. Later the number of products subject to import restraints pro-
gressively increased. According to Viner (1947 p. 618), the Department of 
State was opposed to such measures, but the Department of Agriculture and the 
Congress succeeded in imposing them5.  
Some bilateral agreements negotiated in the framework of the RTAA in-
cluded themselves arrangements allowing quotas and tariff quotas to signatory 
countries (Diebold 1941, p. 37; Eckes 1995, p. 152). In 1939, the latter amount 
to more than a quarter of all import restraints of the United States. One of the 
aims of these measures was to prevent from opportunistic advantage taking by 
non signatory countries6. According to official American statistics, 24,26 % 
(i.e. 213,3 millions of $) of the American imports were subject to quotas and 
tariff quotas in 1939 (Diebold 1941, p. 37). Of course, other countries used 
import quotas as well, but they had lower average tariffs than the United States 
in that period (cf. supra). 
Japan who signed no bilateral agreement in the RTAA framework accepted 
to reduce her exports to the United States in order to avoid new tariff incresases 
on some of her products. Thus the credible threat of retaliation against non 
cooperation with the United States became an efficient although non explicit 
                                                             
5  This assertion is partly inaccurate (cf. infra). But it is true that shaping the trade policy was 
not fully under the control of the Secretary of State. Conflicts about commercial policy ex-
isted within the administration and the State Department’s views did not always finally win 
the day. Some ambiguities in the American trade policy can be explained by those rivalries 
between Departments. Although Hull’s principles on trade policy met with favorable recep-
tion by President Roosevelt, the latter sometimes decided against him for political reasons.  
6  Changing the classification of products was another device to counter the opportunistic 
behavior of some countries. 
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tool of the American trade policy. One of the first voluntary export restraint 
agreements was signed between the United States and Japan in 1937, in order 
to reduce American imports of cotton material coming from this country (Die-
bold 1941, p. 79). 
AAA section 32 made it possible to subsidy agricultural exports and an 
amendment of the AAA voted by Congress in 1935 strengthened that possibil-
ity (Graz 1999, p. 175). Compensating the gap between American and world 
prices, these subsidies mainly benefitted to wheat, flour, raw cotton and cotton 
materials (Diebold 1941, p. 36). 
But direct export subsidies were not the only one government aid to the 
American foreing trade. Actually, at the beginning of the 20th centuy, a weak-
ness of the American international trade system layed in the strong share of 
American trade under the control of foreign shipping. As early as 1916, the 
Shipping Act allows the maritime transportation to depart from the antitrust 
laws on condition that “… shipping rates, pooling arrangements, and shipping 
route allocations, as long as those agreements were first submitted to and ap-
proved by the newly created U.S. Shipping Board.” (James 2002). Jointly with 
the Merchant Marine Act (1920) which made it easier to subsidy shipping 
hiddenly, its aim was to help American ship operaters to confront foreign com-
petition (Dewey 1937). The Merchant Marine Act of 1928 carried on the aid to 
American maritime freight with the explicit goal of leading it to controlling a 
strong share of export and import transportation (Ibid. p. 243). According to 
Dewey’s reckonings the disguised subsidies payed to the American ship opera-
tors by the Post Office Department in the context of the Merchant Marine Act 
of 1928 amounted in June 1934 to about 104 million $ (Dewey 1937 p. 241). 
Finally, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 upheld the aid to the shipping sector 
but it was now made explicit (Dewey 1937). 
The firm stand of some British economists during the negotiations occuring 
between the United Kingdom and the United States from 1942 stressed the high 
importance of these subsidies. Keynes (1943, 1944, 1945) thought that they 
represented a strategic element of America’s trade policy. During the Anglo-
American talks about article VII of the Atlantic Charter he asked the United 
States to withdraw those aids as a pre-requisite to dismantling the British impe-
rial preference system claimed by the American negotiators. But the British did 
not win the case on that matter: four years after the GATT had become effec-
tive Meade (1952, p. 155) still recalled the problems arising in international 
commercial relations from this American subsidy system. And the American 
economist Diebold (1952, p. 31) was in full agreement with him. 
After 1934, the American trade policy started being redevised. However it 
was not just a matter of cutting down the tariffs in order to restore the balance 
in the international trade relations as the sole concern. Regardless of the de-
vices substituting for the tariffs, the goals of the American trade policy con-
veyed what the deciders intended. 
386 
The aims of the American trade policy after 1934 
The spirit in which some members of the State Department had conceived the 
implementation of the RTAA expressed a wish to pursue purely national goals 
rather than to enter into a real cooperation with other countries or to promote 
free trade. Hull himself considered that cutting down tariffs was a means of 
selling out abroad the American surpluses which were worrying specially in 
their employment effects (Hull 1948, p. 133; p. 146). Futhermore after World 
War I, and unlike before, many countries were indebted to the United States. In 
such day and age where international credit distribution was stopped or uneasy, 
keeping a high protection level on American markets prevented economic 
partner countries of United States from paying off their debts in using revenues 
provided by exporting towards that country. 
In other respects Hull proposed to President Roosevelt a precise targeting of 
American sectors where tariffs had to be reduced as a matter of priority. He put 
forward sectors whose inefficency was well known, sectors unable to keep up 
with a big share of demand while benefiting from a long time protection and 
those ones which were not directly challenged by foreign substitute products 
(Hull 1948, p. 374). The principal aim of protection was therefore to make 
efficient some targeted American sectors and to increase the purchasing power 
of American consumers. Hull himself advocated imports restraints of products 
benefitting from tariff cuts, when necessary (cf. Diebold 1941, p. 17). 
These stands publicly taken by the Secretary of State could admitteldly be 
interpreted as a public relations exercise intended for special interest groups 
and parts of voters fearing the increased competition that could result from a 
large economic openness. But the trade liberalization as conceived by Hull 
clearly fell within the scope of increasing the American economic power in the 
world, since he considered that the benefits his country could get as regards 
exports were greater than the value of his concessions regarding imports (Allen 
1953, Schwob 2008)7.  
Negotiating only with predominant exporters, which Hawkins proposed it to 
Hull, was explicitely intended to preserve the American bargaining power 
(Eckes 1995, p. 96). Hull’s comment on this commercial negociation procedure 
spoke for itself:  
If the reduction in duty we granted to A where such as not to injure our own 
producers with whom A was the principal competitor, it was highly unlikely 
that our producers would suffer injury from the competition of imports from 
countries B or C, who where secondary sources of supply. It is a fact that vir-
                                                             
7  “In the first two years of the trade agreeements, the value of our imports from third coun-
tries which, because of equality of treatment, received reductions we granted in agreements, 
amounted to $ 30,000,000. Since our exports which benefited from the protection afforded 
by the same principle amounted to $ 265,000,000, the ratio of benefit in our favor was nine 
to one” (Hull 1948, p. 362). 
387 
tually all countries exporting to us have one or few articles of which they are 
the predominant exporters. They are adapted, through climate, inherited skill, 
or location of raw materials, to make or grow these products better or more 
cheaply than other countries. Therefore, in negotiating the trade agreements, 
we paid special attention to reducing the tariffs to such products, while ignor-
ing other products of which they where not predominant exporters to us. In 
this way we could get the maximum tariff concessions for our own exports to 
country A by concentrating on the imports from country A in which A had her 
largest stake. (Hull 1948, p. 362).  
A government acting in the national interest of its country could not be criti-
cized. But asking reciprocal tariff cuts from partner countries when the Secre-
tary of State publicly recognized the responsibility of the United States in open-
ing the worldwide tariff war and especially in bringing about the British 
imperial preferences underlined that Hull intended to use the existing protec-
tion devices as bargaining tools8. Restoring more balanced trade relations with 
economic partner countries was obvioulsy not the main aim of the RTAA nego-
tiations.  
Some American economists contemporary of Hull stood up for the idea that 
the RTAA weakly changed the spirit of the American trade policy. Diebold 
(1941, p. 23) presented the RTAA as the expression of an “adjusted protection-
nism” conveying change in the protection technology rather than in the concep-
tion of that policy. Bidwell’s9 judgement was even harsher. According to him, 
the prewar American commercial policy was inspired by a: “Rigid and uncom-
promising protectionism.” (Bidwell 1944. p. 340). Having advocated bilateral 
commercial negociations from 1932, he wrote twelve years later about the 
RTAA:  
The long upward trend in American tariffs was checked, and in a few of the 
more important agreeements, particularly those concluded with Canada and 
the United Kingdom, significant reductions were made on both sides. But the 
impartial observer must admit that the thirty agreements concluded to date ha-
ve not accomplished a real reform in the American tariff; consequently, their 
effect on foreign tariffs also has been limited. The agreements were effective 
in stimulating exports, but their effect on our import trade seems have been 
negligible. (Ibid. p. 344).  
Not only did he criticize the commercial policy since 1934 to have mainly 
increased the American exports, contrary to the recommandations of some 
CTA10 experts (Eckes 1995, p. 141-157), but he implicitely blamed it for origi-
nating in a mercantilist design: “We must abandon the notion that exports make 
                                                             
8  It should be remembered that Britain was still the largest market for world imports in 1938 
(cf. Eckes 1995, p. 160). 
9  Bidwell was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations which was sometimes used as a 
think tank by the Department of State. 
10  Committee on Trade Agreements. 
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a peculiar contribution to national wealth, recognizing them merely as a means 
whereby we procure imports” (Bidwell 1944, p. 353). More recently Schatz 
(1970, p. 103) proposed an evaluation of the American trade policy pursued by 
Hull confirming Diebold’s and Bidwell’s judgements: “His insistence on gain-
ing the greatest possible opportunities for American producers while holding 
concessions to a minimum at times made his political arguments seem little 
more than rationalizations.”. Finally Eckes (1995, p. 155) emphasized the for-
eign policy rather than the international trade function of many of the agree-
ments signed in the framework of RTAA. 
We conclude that the RTAA did not revolutionize the American trade pol-
icy. Many economists contemporary to the agreements conceived in that 
framework brought to light the limited results they produced seven to ten years 
after implementation. More recent empirical papers conluded that the decrease 
in the average ad valorem tariff observed after the RTAA came into effect was 
for a sizeable share attributable to import prices variations, owing particularily 
to the strong share of lump sum and compound tariffs. And non tariff barriers 
substituted for tariffs after 1934, or were more intensively used than before. So 
the RTAA restructured the instruments used by the American trade policy. The 
latter was given the goal to expand American exports and to promote the 
American economic and political influence in the world, while the “ancient” 
American trade policy had been more defensive and had first intended to pro-
tect the American economy from foreign competition. Although the changes 
brought by the RTAA were not negligible, they were evidently not characteris-
tic of a revolution: after 1934 and until World War II, the American commer-
cial policy remained far from the internationalist views proclaimed by Hull 
since 1916. 
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